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The Future of the German Past. 
Transatlantic Reflections for the 1990s [1989] 
Michael Geyer & Konrad H. Jarausch  
Abstract: »Die Zukunft der deutschen Vergangenheit. Transatlantische Über-
legungen für die neunziger Jahre«. The comparative reluctance of German his-
torians to engage the postmodern challenge suggested the need for a reflection 
on what post-structuralist impulses might have to offer for analyzing the Cen-
tral European past. In the United States the criticism voiced by Geoff Eley and 
David Blackbourn had already undercut the hegemony of the Sonderweg para-
digm, promoted by the “societal historians” of the Bielefeld school which was 
slow to respond to feminist and everyday history approaches. Michael Geyer 
and I therefore set out to initiate a discussion about the deconstruction of 
“grand narratives” about the German past, in order to create more interpretative 
space for stories that did not fit into the model of “historical social science.” In 
the American intellectual climate this objectivist and modernist outlook 
seemed no longer persuasive enough, since various minorities promoted views 
that emphasized the constructivist character of historical understanding. Our 
joint programmatic essay therefore tried to open space for recovering a greater 
plurality of experiences. 
Keywords: postmodernism, Sonderweg paradigm, master narrative, historical 
social science, plurality of German histories. 
 
Although it seems ages ago, it was only in October 1989 that a group of histo-
rians, who teach at North American universities, gathered for a conference on 
postmodern challenges to German History. The symposium was meant to re-
flect on the changing tempers of the Germans and their (re)appropriations of 
the German past and on the temperament of those who make German history 
their living on this side of the Atlantic. What appeared to be a good idea back 
then, proves to be an even better one after the events of November 1989. Ger-
man history is being remade and, with it, interpreters as well as their interpreta-
tions on both sides of the Atlantic. The call for the conference was a testament 
to the fact that tremors of this impending earthquake could be felt for some 
time, although none of the conference participants had any particular foresight 
into the unfolding events. Already then it seemed that the past had begun to 
change much faster than historians could remake the written record. History 
had come unstuck from all sorts of framing devices that historians had devised 
in order to nail it down. 
                                                             
  Reprint of: Geyer, Michael, and Konrad H. Jarausch. 1989. The Future of the German Past. 
Transatlantic Reflections for the 1990s. Central European History 22 (3/4): 229-259. 
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Customarily, such labors on the German past have indicated contemporary 
fissures. Polish and Czechoslovak emigré manifestos on Central Europe as the 
cultural heartland, the rebirth of the concept of civil society against the totalita-
rianism in the East and the materialism of the West, the rapid succession of 
conflicts in West Germany ever since the mid- to late 1970s over which histor-
ical clothes the (West-)Germans should wear and the simultaneous return of 
most unlikely historical heroes, like Frederick the Great, initially as legitimato-
ry props and increasingly as wedges against an inefficient despotism – all this 
will surely figure as indications of the things to come in future studies of the 
events of 1989/90. The cultural wars over the reappropriation of the German 
past throughout the eighties have already begun to feature prominently in the 
histories of the remaking of Germany.1 They might even vindicate a strong, 
albeit contested sense during the symposium that such historiographic efforts 
mold “masks” for the present – symbolic enactments of the past in order to 
shape an inchoate, even incomprehensible, contemporary reality. Much of the 
debate during the conference centered on the issue of representation and the 
constitution of meaning. These discussions were inspired less by the current 
fashion of “doing” representation than by the recognition that the ongoing 
German search for Sinnstiftung points to significant limitations of the way we 
had written histories before. 
The present changes make such rethinking of the German past all the more 
urgent, because a growing distance between the United States and Europe 
renders the place of historians in their respective (academic) cultures more 
dissimilar than ever in the postwar years. The symposium’s consensus that 
there is no unified and autonomous German past beyond the imagination of its 
makers and consumers may raise the specter of historicism and relativism in 
the hearts of some of our more Fordist colleagues who have come to loathe 
what they consider a carnival of multiplicities.2 Instead, they desire theory- 
“machines,” to pick up on the dissection of this syndrome by Deleuze and 
Guattari,3 as a panacea to the German problem. But the symposium’s consensus 
was not restorative. It was not a plea for an indulgent multiplicity, the melange 
of historical styles that dis/graced American architecture during the Reagan 
                                                             
1  Wolfgang Benz, ed., Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Frankfurt, 1989) 
esp. vol. 3: Gesellschaft and vol. 4: Kultur. Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History 
of West Germany, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass. and Oxford, 1989).  
2  Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German Identity (Cam-
bridge, Mass. and London, 1988), 168-72. To be sure, Maier leaves the issue undecided. 
Behind the mask of the carnevalesque lurks Mikhail Baktin, Rabelais and His World, trans. 
H. Iswolsky (Cambridge, 1968), and the rediscovery of alterity. 
3  Especially Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia, trans. B. Masumi (Minneapolis. 1987). On the (very different) German turns 
against hyperrealist theories see Willem van Reijen, ed., Die unvollendete Vernunft: Mod-
erne vs. Postmoderne (Frankfurt, 1982). 
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decade and has become a new reality of the history profession as well. The 
consensus in favor of multiplicity emerged at its most surprising and stimulat-
ing moments, as carnivals truly should be. It came about in the uses of “simple 
forms of narration”4 to capture the multiple experiences of subjects and objects 
of history and in an evident distance to old and new monumental histories with 
their quest for a totality of sources and synthetic homogenization of the plot-
line. It became transparent in a conversational, interacting, and remarkably 
sociable history as a practice of weaving together many strands of historical 
knowledge and narrative. It appeared in the transgression of boundaries that 
indicate the powers and the limits of mastery – be it that this mastery appears 
as the historical costumes of a novel breed of Lancelot historians5 from Germa-
ny, who have their “conditio Germaniae”6 weighing down on them, or be it as 
the effort by modernists to propagate their constructivist vision of a well-
ordered science state.7 
Sponsored by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the sym-
posium on “German Histories: Challenges in Theory, Practice, Technique” was 
intended as a historiographic complement to literary and politiological reflec-
tions on the study of the Germans and the Germanies in the United States. Like 
the literary scholars and the political scientists had done before them, the histo-
rians’ task was to reflect on the current state of German studies in American 
historiography. In view of shifting predilections within European historiogra-
phy and more fundamental challenges to the general discipline of History, it 
seemed worth exploring if and with what consequences German historiography 
could take up the gauntlet and make a postmodern turn and if a rethinking of 
the Germanness and History-ness of that particular past might bring German 
historiography any closer to non-historical studies of Germany and the Ger-
mans. That it would also have to bring German historians closer to (central) 
European studies was an important subtext. It was an intellectual exercise. Now 
that the Germans have begun to practice their own postmodern politics and are 
forming their own new imaginary of their past and present,8 intellectual and 
                                                             
4  André Jolles, Einfache Formen: Legende, Sage, Mythe, Rätsel, Spruch, Kasus, Memorabile, 
Märchen, Witz. 2d ed. (Halle, 1956). 
5  During a memorable lecture on film and memory Anton Kaes (see n. 53) showed a film clip 
from Monty Python’s “Holy Grail” in which Lancelot is lost in the fog of a medieval forest 
only to end up on a modern English street. Lancelot is frisked by two policemen who find a 
character dressed up in medieval clothes highly suspicious. Is this the fate of the Rankean 
historians’ search for veracity, asked Kaes. 
6  Michael Stürmer, “Mitten in Europa: Versuchung und Verdammnis der Deutschen,” Disso-
nanzen des Fortschritts: Essays über Geschichte und Politik in Deutschland (Munich and 
Zurich, 1986), 314, in which the (cultural) conditio becomes the (geographic) site and vice 
versa. 
7  Jürgen Kocka, Geschichte und Aufklärung (Göttingen, 1989). 
8  See generally Maier, Unmasterable Past, passim. Reinhard Merkel, “Wahnbild Nation,” 
Die Zeit (16 March 1990), 18, is a gloss on recent publications. Our use of the “imaginary” 
 
 187 
practical currents will have to merge in a (re)consideration of the German con-
dition and of the identities of Europe. This is the challenge for the next decade. 
II 
German history in the United States was propelled into the foreground by the 
immediate and burning concern with the German problem half a century ago. 
Postwar historians in the United States converted this interest into powerful 
images and narratives. They shaped in crucial respects the postwar imagination 
of Germany and the Germans. In particular, they countered the strong national 
biases in British, French, and German postwar histories of Germany and sur-
passed them in developing academic strategies for a redemption of the German 
past by locating the source of “deviance” in the “premodernity” or “anti-
modernity” of its elite rather than in national character.9 This intellectual initia-
tive was nothing less than the academic equivalent to the transatlantic pacifica-
tion of Europe after World War II. Its crucial intervention consisted in replac-
ing competing national histories in Europe by an implicit or explicit narrative 
of “Western” development. Nonetheless, postwar German History in the 
United States has been a distinctly univocal and national History. As such it 
found an important place within the discipline and gained a general academic 
and, occasionally, even popular audience.10 
                                                                                                                                
(l’imaginaire social) reflects the oeuvres of Cornelius Castoriadis and Claude Lefort who 
both emphasize the creative/constructive core of the social historical world. See the brief 
summary in John B. Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology (Berkeley, 1984), 16-41. 
The most powerful recent statement on this issue is Istvan Meszaros, The Power of Ideolo-
gy (New York, 1989). The most successful historiographic rendition of the social imaginary 
is Paul Veyne, Writing History: Essay on Epistemology, trans. M. Moore-Riuvolucri (Mid-
dletown, Conn., 1984). 
9  A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London, 1961), and his The Struggle 
for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford, 1954), are good examples of this older national 
historiography. The debate on the Taylor thesis shows how this paradigmatic view is re-
placed. See William Roger Louis, ed., The Origins of the Second World War: A. J .P. Tay-
lor and His Critics (New York, 1972). The most popular alternative text was Fritz Stern, 
The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of Germanic Ideology (Berkeley, 
1961). The rediscovery of “national character” since the late 1970s is a German preoccupa-
tion. See among the “makers” of such imaginaries Werner Weidenfeld, ed., Die Identität 
der Deutschen (Munich, 1983), and among the dissectors Axel Drews, Ute Gerhard, and 
Jürgen Link, “Moderne Kollektivsymbolik: Eine diskurstheoretische orientierte Einführung 
mit Auswahlbibliographie,” Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Lite-
ratur (1985), Sonderheft 1, 256-374. By far the most successful analysis of this syndrome is 
the special issue of the South Atlantic Quarterly 87 (1988), no. 3: “Postmodernism and Ja-
pan.” 
10  Fritz Stern, “German History in America, 1884-1984:” Central European History 19 
(1986): 131-63, and the basic assessment by Leonard Krieger, “European History in Ameri-
ca,” History, ed. John Higham (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965), 233-313. 
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Wartime and postwar German history in the United States was not ordinary, 
run-of-the-mill history writing. Beyond the intellectual powers of the individual 
historians the emerging History of Germany helped to constitute a transatlantic, 
Western understanding of the European and the American past.11 Russia and 
eastern Europe being excluded from the charmed circle of the West, the central 
European story shrank to a German one, while Eastern Europe atrophied into 
ethnic or area studies. Several aspects of this drama fascinated intellectuals in 
particular. By rejecting parliamentary democracy, Germany became the “other” 
among advanced nations, challenging self-evident expectations of liberalism 
and progress. Due to its efficient military and industrial organization, Prussia-
Germany twice involved Americans in World Wars, imperiling but ultimately 
validating Western superiority. Finally, in perpetrating the Holocaust, NS Ger-
many turned into the ultimate negator of the twentieth century which lacked 
even Stalinism’s “progressive” aims, reinforcing with its crimes against hu-
manity the importance of moral codes for civilized behavior.12 
At every point in time and from every vantage point the problematic of 
“progress” as the validating norm for a unilinear modern History of the West 
was reinforced. The emerging imaginary screened and rearranged the expecta-
tions of a wartime American audience and it yoked Germany and America 
together in what proved to be a remarkably sturdy construction. Such transat-
lantic history, centered in the United States, fit the more universalist interpreta-
tions of industrial societies and their mis/development very nicely and, thus, 
also gained interdisciplinary valence. It helped to depoliticize American histo-
riography on Germany, which distinguished it sharply from the initially accla-
matory and later critical national histories of the German counterpart.13 It al-
ways also contained an implicitly comparative perspective, thereby subtly 
bolstering the American way of life which became the measure for Western 
progress. Every critique of the German past thus said something about the 
virtues of the United States as well as about potential dangers of political 
excess for industrial society. 
                                                             
11  Volker Berghahn, “Deutschlandbilder 1945-1965: Angloamerikanische Historiker und 
moderne deutsche Geschichte.” Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach dem Zweiten Welt-
krieg 1945-1965, ed. Ernst Schulin (Munich, 1989), 239-72. 
12  Michael Geyer, “Deutsche – Europäer – Weltbürger: Eine Überlegung zum Aufstieg und 
Fall des Modernismus in der Historiographie,” Deutschland und Europa in der Neuzeit: 
Festschrift für K.O. Freiherr von Aretin, ed. R. Melville et al. (Stuttgart, 1988), 27-47; and 
the introduction of Konrad H. Jarausch and Larry Eugene Jones to In Search of a Liberal 
Germany: Studies in the History of German Liberalism (Oxford, 1990). 
13  Winfried Schulze, Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945 (Munich, 1989); Hans-
Ulrich Wehler, “Historiography in Germany Today,” Observations on “The Spiritual Situa-
tion of the Age,” ed. Jürgen Habermas, trans. A. Buchwalter (Cambridge, Mass. and Lon-
don, 1987), 221-59. Bernd Faulenbach, ed., Geschichtswissenschaft in Deutschland 
(Munich, 1974); Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Gegenwärtige Tendenzen in der Geschichts-
schreibung der Bundesrepublik,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 7 (1981): 149-88. 
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Central European specialists live off the extraordinarily powerful position of 
postwar German History in American academe to this very day, even if that 
prominence has been the object of a long series of challenges. Among these are 
changing public and scholarly preoccupations with other areas of the globe or 
shifting methodologies which emerged within specific national contexts like 
“British” social history or, more recently, “French” cultural history. They have 
largely dissipated German History’s explanatory power, but never quite suc-
ceeded in dislodging it from its place in the American organization of historical 
knowledge. The field continues to flourish, by all accounts. Some even speak 
of a “golden age.” For the eighties, however, the quality of gold is always 
worth further scrutiny. 
We need not recall the entire history of German historiography in the United 
States in order to make sense of these changes. While there were always many 
kinds of histories present, the American masternarrative of the German past 
was initially dominated by an idealist perspective. This was not, for the most 
part, intellectual history, but it was the unified History of the idea of the Ger-
man nation state as it unfolded in various states of objectification through the 
course of the modern age. This idealist history showed a marked preference for 
some approaches (interpretation as verstehendes Beschreiben) and for some 
objects of study (ideas/phenomena) over others (analysis and social structures 
respectively).14 However, even when methodology began to shift toward social 
history, the underlying pattern of explanation/interpretation and the thematic 
core of monographs remained unchallenged. According to Leonard Krieger, 
idealist and materialist history alike maintain(ed) “time’s reasons”15 by adher-
ing to a notion of empty time and the representational quality of historical 
texts/sources.16 They both cling to nineteenth-century notions of realism, refut-
ing turn-of-the-century fears of relativism. Moreover, they agree in their as-
sessment of the development of modern/industrial society and the place of 
Germany in that process. As a result, clashes over German History did not 
challenge the framing of the American imaginary, but were contained within it. 
Political, intellectual, or social history merely became alternate strategies for 
explaining German deviance from presumed Western norms. 
                                                             
14  Jörn Rüsen, Grundzüge einer Historik, 3 vols. (Göttingen, 1983-89); Reinhart Koselleck, 
Hermeneutik und Historik (Heidelberg, 1987). 
15  Leonard Krieger, Ranke: The Meaning of History (Chicago and London, 1977), and his 
Time’s Reasons: Philosophies of History Old and New (Chicago and London, 1989). From 
within Germany, it looks as if the two were radically opposed. See Wolfgang Weber, “The 
Long Reign and the Final Fall of the German Conception of History: A Historical-
Sociological View.” Central European History 21 (1988): 379-95. 
16  Jürgen Kocka and Thomas Nipperdey, Theorie und Erzählung in der Geschichte (Munich, 
1979); Reinhart Koselleck, Heinrich Lutz, and Jörn Rüsen, eds., Formen der Geschichts-
schreibung (Munich, 1982). 
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The difference from German historiography in Germany becomes readily 
apparent when one compares the roles which social history plays in Germany 
and in the United States. In West Germany, Historische Sozialwissenschaft 
gained a distinct framing quality, epitomized, for example, in Wehler’s 
(school-)masterly contributions and Habermas’s constitutional metanarrative.17 
Gesellschaftsgeschichte strove to establish its own, distinct metahistorical 
agenda. It could not help it, because every other approach had the same tran-
scendental aspirations, working backwards to define a metahistorical ground 
and forward to capture an intellectual public.18 It was set, not against idealist 
history (with which it agreed in its basic outlook more than its practitioners 
were likely to admit), but against orthodox Marxist and traditional national 
History as a conscious effort to create a progressive imaginary. In spite of 
valiant efforts, the Bielefeld school neither gained complete dominance in 
social history nor became the single new voice for German historiography. The 
partial failure of Gesellschaftsgeschichte points to an enduring feature of Ger-
man culture, the peculiar multiplication of imaginaries which makes the Ger-
man academic and intellectual situation so volatile and explosive. Debates over 
imaginaries are culture wars, be they fought out between states like the FRG 
and GDR or between states of mind like the Fischer school and the Ritter 
school. 
Although it looks like any other social history, the place of Gesellschafts-
geschichte in the organization of historical knowledge and its role in the forma-
tion of cultural capital differ from other countries. Its comparative bent not-
withstanding, German Gesellschaftsgeschichte has become every bit as uni-
vocal and as national as others.19 It claims to be more western, more liberal, and 
more pluralist than its competitors. But it has developed its own national pedi-
                                                             
17  Compare Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s old with his new magnum opus: Bismarck und der Impe-
rialismus (Cologne and Berlin, 1969) and his recent Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 
vols. 1 and 2 (Munich, 1987). See also Jürgen Habermas, Kleine politische Schriften, I-IV 
(Frankfurt, 1981), Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit: Kleine politische Schriften V (Frankfurt, 
1985), with discussions on politics and modernity, culminating in “Geschichtsbewusstsein 
und posttraditionelle Identität: Die Westorientierung der Bundesrepublik,” Eine Art Scha-
densabwicklung: Kleine politische Schriften VI (Frankfurt, 1987). 
18  Contrast Klaus Hildebrand, “Geschichte oder ‘Gesellschaftsgeschichte’? Die Notwendig-
keit einer politischen Geschichtsschreibung von den internationalen Beziehungen,” Histori-
sche Zeitschrift 223 (1976): 328-75, with Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Geschichtswissenschaft 
jenseits des Historismus (Düsseldorf, 1971). A polemical record of the academic wars 
informing this division is Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Entsorgung der deutschen Vergangenheit? 
Ein polemischer Essay zum “Historikerstreit” (Munich, 1988). 
19  See the outline of a discipline by Jürgen Kocka, Sozialgeschichte: Begriff. Entwicklung, 
Probleme. 2nd ed. (Göttingen, 1986), and the germanocentrism of comparative history in 
idem, ed., Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert: Deutschland im europäischen Vergleich (Mu-
nich, 1988) – a project which could take its intellectual premises from Fritz Stem, A Ger-
man-American Century: Complementarity, Conflict, Collaboration, a speech delivered on 
the occasion of the German-American day, October 6, 1988 (New York, 1988). 
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gree, a rational, enlightenment tradition,20 and has begun to conquer the longue 
durée of modern Germany in massive efforts at synthesizing and homogenizing 
German history-writing. In its aspiration to supplant alternative master-
narratives it has begun to marginalize some fields of study and some new ap-
proaches. For instance, Gesellschaftsgeschichte has shown a declining interest 
in traditional areas of social history which have become the main body of so-
cial history in the United States. The quick abortion of psychologically sensi-
tive history required its reintroduction via American-French cultural history 
outside of historiography.21 The blockage of partisan labor history in Germany 
between the 1960s and the 1980s pushed History Workshop influences and 
studies of popular culture into a transformed Volkskunde.22 The deep distrust of 
gender history and of every-day histories of experience/consciousness exempli-
fies most clearly the elective distance which set a hegemonic social history 
against the most active, albeit subaltern, voices in the field.23 Such History does 
                                                             
20  Jörn Rüsen et al., Die Zukunft der Aufklärung (Frankfurt, 1988), and his earlier “Geschichte 
als Aufklärung? Oder das Dilemma des historischen Denkens zwischen Herrschaft und 
Emanzipation,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 7 (1981): 189-218. Most recently, Georg G. 
Iggers, “Rationality and History” (Buffalo, 1990, MS). 
21  One can follow this trend both in journals like Freibeuter with its strong Italo-French 
leanings (including the Italo-French undercurrents of Americanism) and in the delayed re-
ception of historians like Dominick LaCapra, Geschichte und Kritik (Frankfurt, 1987) or 
Geschichte Denken: Neubestimmung und Perspektiven moderner europäischer Geistesge-
schichte (Frankfurt, 1988). The German focus is still on mentalité. See Volker Sellin, 
“Mentalität und Mentalitätsgeschichte,” Historische Zeitschrift 241 (1985): 556-98. The 
subjectivist notion of consciousness hovers on the margins of literary-historical analysis. 
See Peter Schöttler, “Sozialgeschichte, ‘Erfahrungsansatz’ und Sprachanalyse,” KultuRRe-
volution 11 (1986): 56-60. 
22  Lutz Niethammer, ed., “Die Menschen machen ihre Geschichte nicht aus freien Stücken, 
aber sie machen sie selbst”: Einladung zu einer Geschichte des Volkes in Nordrhein-
Westfalen (Berlin, 1988); and especially the three-volume series on the Ruhrgebiet: “Die 
Jahre weiss man nicht, wo man die heute hinsetzen soll”: Faschismus-Erfahrungen im 
Ruhrgebiet (Bonn and Berlin, 1983); “Hinterher merkt man, dass es richtig war, dass es 
schiefgegangen ist”: Nachkriegserfahrungen im Ruhrgebiet (Berlin and Bonn, 1983); 
(together with A. von Plato), “Wir kriegen jetzt andere Zeiten”: Auf der Suche nach der 
Erfahrung des Volkes in nachfaschistischen Ländern (Bonn and Berlin, 1985); F. J. 
Brüggemeier, Leute vor Ort: Ruhrbergleute und Ruhrbergbau 1889-1914 (Munich, 1983). 
For the contrasting strategies of scientification see Jürgen Kocka, “Klassen oder Kultur: 
Durchbrüche oder Sackgassen in der Arbeitergeschichte,” Merkur 36 (1982): 955-65; Klaus 
Tenfelde, Sozialgeschichte der Bergarbeiterschaft an der Ruhr im 19. Jahrhundert (Bonn, 
1977). Compare further the Volkskunde approach of Wolfgang Kaschuba and Carola Lipp, 
Dörfliches Überleben: Zur Geschichte der materiellen und sozialen Reproduktion ländli-
cher Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Tübingen, 1982), with Josef Mooser, Ländli-
che Klassengesellschaft 1780-1848: Bauern und Unterschichten, Landwirtschaft und Ge-
werbe im östlichen Westfalen (Göttingen, 1984). 
23  Rather than fastening on Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s legendary footnote on Frauengeschichte in 
his Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte (Munich, 1987), I: 553, it is worth pointing to the rift 
between Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics 
(New York, 1987), and Gisela Bock, “Die Frauen und der Nationalsozialismus: Bemerkun-
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not tolerate unzoned and unbounded spheres of experience; it recoils from 
excessive, self-willed articulations of resistance that reinscribe the subjective 
nature of historical objects;24 and it rejects the appropriations of the past by 
non-professionals. 
In the United States, social history never gained the same framing power, 
even if some historians may have aspired to it.25 It only sought to provide more 
compelling answers to the established questions about the German catastrophe. 
Ironically, this more modest approach had profound, if quite unexpected, con-
sequences. German social history in the United States expanded quickly and 
borrowed freely from other disciplines. It developed a certain penchant for 
scholarly adventure and exploration. As Jarausch and Johnson indicate below, 
there was and is a certain frontier spirit among social historians who ventured 
forth from the safe havens of established scholarship and look back at it with 
disdain. Social history gained a roaming capacity which has kept it at an uneasy 
distance not just to mainstream historiography, but also to historical sociolo-
gy.26 It is in this capacity that some of the social historians came, almost unwit-
tingly, to the point of breaking with established scholarship. They unblocked 
the framing control over the objects of study and approaches in German history 
and thoroughly opened up the status order of scholarly pursuits by uncoupling 
their work initially from the teleology of 1933 and, increasingly, from the idea 
of “progress” as the American way. 
Inspired by social movements as well as intellectual departures of British 
and French scholars, American social history has turned to those experiences 
and approaches which German social historians have tended to neglect. It has 
                                                                                                                                
gen zu einem Buch von Claudia Koonz,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 15 (1989): 563-79, 
which reflects the distance between two academic cultures. 
24  This is not necessarily the agenda of every-day history, but it is surely the aim of Alf  
Lüdtke, Alltagsgeschichte: Zur Rekonstruktion historischer Erfahrungen und Lebensweisen 
(Frankfurt and New York, 1986). The “classic” German text on this issue is quite unrelated 
to Alltagsgeschichte. It is Alexander Kluge and Oskar Negt, Geschichte und Eigensinn: Ge-
schichtliche Organisation der Arbeitsvermögen; Deutschland als Produktionsöffentlichkeit; 
Gewalt des Zusammenhanges (Frankfurt, 1981). 
25  The most formidable example of an integral approach is Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bour-
geois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I 
(Princeton, 1975). See also Gerald Feldman and Heinrich A. Winkler, ed., Organisierter 
Kapitalismus: Voraussetzungen und Anfänge (Göttingen, 1974). In his contribution to this 
volume Feldman already indicates his turn to a historiographic hyperrealism which be-
comes overwhelming in his Iron and Steel in the German Inflation (Princeton, 1975). It is a 
most telling exercise to compare the latter with his Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany 
1914-1918 (Princeton, 1966) as one of the foremost examples of a postwar American his-
torical narrative. Note especially the economy of documentation and the paradigmatic qual-
ity of the narration in the earlier work. 
26  Konrad Jarausch, “German Social History – American Style,” Journal of Social History 19 
(1985): 349-59, and his introduction to German Professions, 1800-1950, ed. Geoffrey 
Cocks and Konrad Jarausch (New York and Oxford, 1990), 9-24. 
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emphasized the “difference” and the antagonist quality of its histories to the 
hegemonic national History. It has begun to rethink the notion of mentalité to 
encompass the inner voice, the consciousness of people. It has also come to 
pursue the study of subordinate groups in their own right as “subalterns.” It has 
been open to methodological experiments, ranging from the refinement of 
quantitative approaches to a heightened awareness of anthropological concerns 
with cultures of alterity and the contextuality or historicity of theory. The dis-
cussion on interdisciplinary approaches like German Studies or the turn to 
culture among recent Ph.D. students are indicative of the youngest generation 
of scholars turning to a historical exploration of representation – not as a new 
kind of “culturalism,” but as explorations into the nexus of power/knowledge/ 
language. Gender history has become the most provocative and comprehensive 
articulation of this general orientation. It has dislodged the question of Ger-
manness in favor of all-encompassing queries concerning the articulation of 
difference in the German past. It has forged, on this basis, a new transatlantic 
link between contemporary American concerns and European pasts. 
Social history was well on its way to developing multivocal histories of the 
German and European past, shedding in this process its behaviorist skin. Yet, 
as different as this history became from Gesellschaftsgeschichte in its increas-
ing rejection of unilinearity and homogeneity, it did not quite live up to its 
promises. While its a-political thrust has been repeatedly criticized, its main 
problem and its undoing was not a neglect of power, but its inability to cope 
with questions of consciousness and cultural causation. While encouraging 
experimentation, its diffuseness also rendered it difficult to construct new pat-
terns of meaning. 
For some time, it appeared as if a group of British scholars would be able to 
extend their contestatory version of social history into an alternative History of 
Germany.27 The British-German Sonderweg controversy in the late 1970s 
served as the main launching pad for this endeavor. All the pieces were in place 
for a rethinking of the German past. British history from below, exemplified by 
the History Workshop movement, provided a solid methodological founda-
tion.28 Comparative social history added the tools to upset the claims for Ger-
man exceptionalism at least the way they were advanced in the past.29 Lastly, a 
notion of popular culture and of ideology, borrowed from Gramsci, provided 
the means for reintegrating social and political histories into a long history of 
                                                             
27  Richard J. Evans, ed., Society and Politics in Wilhelmine Germany (London and New York, 
1978); David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois 
Society and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany (New York and London, 1984). 
28  Richard J. Evans, Rethinking German History: Nineteenth-Century Germany and the 
Origins of the Third Reich (London and Winchester, Mass., 1987).  
29  Geoff Eley, From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past (Boston and 
London, 1986).  
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contestations over the identity of the German nation.30 The reasons for the 
ultimate lack of success of this intervention were again beyond the quality of 
individual contributions. The depletion of British academia was perhaps the 
most important factor (although it profited the United States), but the resolute 
German defense of a Weberian Gesellschaftsgeschichte also figured prominent-
ly. A likely third cause was the Eurocentrism of the debate which, after all, was 
but the last installment of a century-old dispute between Great Britain and 
Germany.31 Though this revisionism had some residual appeal in Europe, even 
its potentially controversial “normalization” of the German experience met 
with a strange silence in the United States. 
The upshot of the Eley-Blackbourn-Wehler debate on this side of the Atlan-
tic consisted in debunking the postwar imaginary without replacing it by anoth-
er one. Despite some rather nasty professional affairs à la mode allemande,32 
German historians in the United States treated the Sonderweg controversy 
much as American industry used deregulation. After the exceptionalism of 
German History was removed, almost anything became possible. Heterogeneity 
gave way to a random multiplication of histories. At the same time, “single-
issue” histories were overshadowed by a new celebratory style in which the 
(German) past and even historiographic controversies were shown off exhibi-
tion-style.33 This history-on-a-pedestal made the past and its historians into 
artifacts of the 1980s. The decade saw both a multiplication and an aesthetici-
zation of the past which neutralized heterogeneous and subaltern histories. 
Despite a residual and subterraneous adherence to a transatlantic narrative, 
German history in the eighties thereby became the very expression of what its 
intellectuals valiantly tried to fend off. In embracing a new “frameless-ness” 
German history has gone, in its own way, “postmodernist” and, apparently 
                                                             
30  David Blackbourn, Populists and Patricians: Essays in Modern German History (London 
and Boston, 1987).  
31  Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London and Bos-
ton, 1980); Bernd Faulenbach, Ideologie des deutschen Weges: Die deutsche Geschichte in 
der Historiographie zwischen Kaiserreich und Nationalsozialismus (Munich, 1980). 
32  “Debate: David Abraham’s The Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” Central European 
History 17 (1984): 159-293. 
33  Fritz Stern, Dreams and Delusions: The Drama of German History (New York, 1987), and 
Gordon Craig, The Germans (New York, 1982). For Germany the same issue appears as a 
revival of museums and historical exhibitions. See Hartmut Boockmann, Geschichte im 
Museum (Munich, 1987); Alfred Frei, “Der neue Museumsboom – Kultur für alle,” Neue 
Politische Literatur 32 (1986): 385-97; W. Zacharias, ed., Zeitphänomen Musealisierung: 
Das Verschwinden der Gegenwart und die Konstruktion der Erinnerung (Essen, 1990). As 
alternative interpretation: Hermann Lübbe, “Der Fortschritt und das Museum,” Dilthey 
Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften I (1983): 39-56 against 
the background of his analysis of contemporary culture Zeit-Verhältnisse: Zur Kulturge-
schichte des Fortschritts (Graz and Vienna, 1983). 
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happily, indulges in its newfound liberties.34 Although German historians are 
not exactly known for thinking out strategies of postmodernism, they collec-
tively practice a postmodern style with panache or a certain furor, as may be 
the preference. This turn to a postmodern style in history has acted as a strong 
solvent. German historiography in the United States has given up a univocal 
national History so that these days the detractors of the discipline are the last 
ones to hold most firmly to it. At the same time, German historians in Germany 
have shifted into political overdrive in the Historikerstreit, involving academic 
and public struggles over a recentralized and, indeed, reunified national History 
as well as a relentless war over German identity. During the second half of the 
1980s, German and American histories of Germany have developed in quite 
radically different, even opposite directions. 
III 
For a long time German historians in the United States ignored the intellectual 
challenges that stemmed from a series of interventions which are summarily 
called “postmodern.” Reluctant to embrace any new strategies, they missed the 
transformation of the German cultural scene, as opposed to that of the aca-
demic historians, which had become one of the hotbeds of post-French, post-
modern thought.35 Beyond a simplistic traditionalism, both practical and moral 
issues may explain their hesitancy to some point. Would the conscious decon-
struction of the/any national masternarrative not also signal the end of the privi-
leged position of German history in American academia? How should one 
                                                             
34  We have no desire to complicate an already complicated debate (summarized in Andreas 
Huyssen, “Mapping the Postmodern,” After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, 
Postmodernism [Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1986], 179-221), but it seems appropriate 
to think of the historicist multiplication effects and the “universal abandon” of postmodern-
ism (Andrew Ross, ed., Universal Abandon: The Politics of Postmodernism [Minneapolis, 
1988]) as only one trend in the process of the reorganization of cultural capital. The other is 
very much a discussion with our ancients, partly because their agenda has become visible 
again, partly because this discussion helps formulating the difference of the present. The 
problem with this strategy consists in the dual challenge of (a) going back critically to the 
European sources for knowledge and (b) critically assessing the American organization of 
European cultural capital in the 1930s and 1940s. The fatal flaw of the postmodernist de-
bate consists in its unwillingness to deal with the American configuration of cultural capi-
tal. The result is an evasive historicism. 
35  On the German-French intellectual debate see among others Gerhard Raulet, Gehemmte 
Zukunft: Zur gegenwärtigen Krise der Emanzipation (Darmstadt and Neuwied, 1986), and 
especially Wolfgang Welsch, Unsere Postmoderne Moderne (Weinheim, 1987); Andreas 
Huyssen, “Postmoderne – eine amerikanische Internationale?” Postmoderne: Zeichen eines 
kulturellen Wandels, ed. Andreas Huyssen and Klaus R. Scherpe (Reinbek, 1986); and 
Wolfgang Welsch, “Vielheit oder Einheit? Zum gegenwärtigen Spektrum der philosophi-
schen Diskussion um die ‘Postmoderne’: Französische, italienische, amerikanische, deut-
sche Aspekte,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 94 (1987): 14-142. 
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teach undergraduates, if an endless past with its many stories spilled over into 
History? Was the concern with performance and will/decisionism not an omi-
nous return to interwar neo-conservatism and, beyond that, to a romanticism 
which had been identified as one of the main sources of German disasters? Was 
it not utterly frivolous to presume that the same story could be told in many 
ways in the face of efforts to elide the Holocaust?36 These and similar reserva-
tions dovetailed with those of the profession at large – underscoring the tight 
link between the postwar academic profession and the interpretation of the 
German past. 
However, traditional historians have unwittingly managed to undercut post-
war conventions even further in defending disciplinary terrain. The rush to 
prove history right against new waves of “relativism” and “narrativism” has led 
many scholars to reiterate one or the other truth claim of nineteenth-century 
historians or social scientists.37 In order to cope with present challenges, they 
seem to repeat past stages of historiography and philosophy of history as simu-
lacrum.38 The consequence is the purest form of historicism possible, the indi-
scriminate borrowing of past styles, ideas, and images. The historians’ debates 
resemble parades with historical motifs – one float exhibits Ranke and his neo-
Rankeans, the other Droysen among his neo’s, and yet another Weber and his 
Weberites. “Classic modernism” and its concern with relativism concludes the 
procession in Germany, while Dewey and “Free Speech” usually perform the 
same function in the United States. This is what Derrida called “citationality,”39 
the cloning of history and its historians. Such excessive recourse to earlier 
theory in the name of veracity cannot but destroy the last remnants of belief in 
historical truth claims. Traditional historians deflected the French intellectual 
challenges of the seventies only to end up in the postmodern style of the eigh-
ties which they defended as American pluralism and pragmatism. Living and 
thinking in a faux past (instead of thinking the past in the present) has not 
                                                             
36  The Holocaust as test for any and all postmodern strategies is discussed by Saul  
Friedlander, “Some Reflections on the Historicization of National Socialism,” Reworking 
the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians’ Debate, ed. Peter Baldwin (Boston, 
1980), 88-101, and Dan Diner, “Between Aporia and Apology: On the Limits of Histori-
cizing National Socialism,” ibid., 135-44. 
37  Georg Iggers, “The ‘Methodenstreit’ in International Perspective: The Reorientation of 
Historical Studies at the Turn of the Nineteenth to the Twentieth Century,” Storia della Sto-
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pear, enriched with a heavy dose of American pragmatism, in David Hollinger, “The Return 
of the Prodigal: The Persistence of Historical Knowing,” American Historical Review 94 
(1989): 610-21. 
38  On the simulacrum see Gilles Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” October 27 (1983): 
45-56, and the ever provocative Jean Baudrillard, Simulations (New York, 1983). 
39  Jacques Derrida, The Postcard from Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. A. Bass (Chicago 
and London, 1987). 
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helped to meet the postmodern challenge to the intellectual foundations of 
historical work. 
Postmodern thought is most commonly associated with the critique of narra-
tives and tropes.40 It allows historians both to distinguish their discipline from 
other forms of knowledge about the past (like literature, sociology, mythology) 
and to draw together vast quantities of traces of the past in a single narrative or 
hypothesis. The “incredulity toward metanarratives”41 appears counter-histo-
rical at first sight, but it is the starting point for an analysis of the current histo-
riographic condition in which historical knowledge is “dispersed in the clouds 
of narrative language elements,” and consists of an unconnected “local deter-
minism,”42 to borrow from the much broader argument of Lyotard’s “postmo-
dern condition.” The “localism” of German historiography is readily apparent. 
The days of “grand history” or of “grand theory” are gone. There is no longer 
quite the same “will to allegory”43 that has characterized German historiogra-
phy throughout most of the modern period. Two articulations of this kind of 
writing stood out. We remember faintly those nationalist histories in which 
Bismarck made and was Germany, in which a subjectified Germany was the 
hero or villain, or in which collectives like the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, or 
the Junkers moved the world. The “analytic” equivalent of these dramas is, 
perhaps, somewhat more vivid in our memory. It was a History in which im-
personal “forces” ran the show, be it the old national character, be it industry or 
society, or, the high point of modernism, some abstract kind of contradiction or 
ambivalence which did it all.44 
It is common to welcome the disappearance of such explanations as the “end 
of ideology.”45 However, more careful scrutiny indicates that the clusters of 
“grand theory/metanarratives/ideology” have simply gone underground. 
Though metanarratives were not much talked about during the eighties, they 
retained their disciplining power all the same in an unreflected way. A novel 
                                                             
40  For the American critique see Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in 
Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore and London, 1973), and his Tropics of Discourse: 
Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore and London, 1978). Among the newer interpreta-
tions see John E. Toews, “Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn,” American Histori-
cal Review 92 (1987): 879-907; Robert F. Berkhofer, “The Challenge of Poetics to (Nor-
mal) Historical Practice,” Poetics Today 9 (1988): 435-52; Linda Orr, “The Revenge of 
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41  Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. 
Bennington and B. Massumi (Minneapolis, 1984), XXIV. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Paul Smith, “The Will to Allegory in Postmodernism,” Dalhousie Review 62 (1982): 17-25.  
44  Following Leonard Krieger, Time’s Reasons, we put two traditions together as expressions 
of a singular (modernist) conjuncture, which, in Germany, are professionally and politically 
hostile. 
45  On posthistoire and its tradition see the reflections by Lutz Niethammer, “Afterthoughts on 
Posthistoire,” History and Memory 7 (1989): 25-54. 
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kind of relentlessly chronicling histories46 that unload masses of source mate-
rials in a condensed and synthesized form on a tiny topic are one expression of 
this forgetfulness. These local studies depend entirely on a prearranged under-
standing of what is important. They are lost once these arrangements collapse, 
and defensively protest the veracity of their findings in order to imply the plau-
sibility of their submerged assumptions. On the other end of the spectrum, we 
find an increasing penchant for eclectic narratives. Grand theory and history are 
present as echoes of once explicit arguments in Nipperdey’s artful rumination 
as well as Fritz Stern’s clever interpretations and H.-U. Wehler’s relentless 
analyses.47 Indeed, historians, who once prided themselves on their grand de-
sign, have become allusive and elusive in their pursuits of the German past. 
Instead of unfolding powerful narratives of deviance they resort to a petty 
moralism, and instead of presenting grand explanations they engage in mass-
production history-writing in which even the most obstreperous facts are 
processed into History. In this light, German historiography in the eighties 
appears to be simultaneously underreflected in the wake of the collapse of 
grand histories of all kinds and yet overdetermined by submerged knowledge 
structures. 
It is one thing to deconstruct such epistemes48 in a critique of metanarra-
tives. It is another matter to move beyond them. The symposium took first 
steps in this direction by looking at the problem of alterity. It presented a forum 
for exploring the history of gender (I. Hull) as an “internal other” and the histo-
ry of Austria (J. Boyer) as an “external other.” Both show the effects of margi-
nalization as well as the radical impact of a recovery and revaluation of subor-
dinate histories on German History. These alternative perspectives raise the 
question whether it makes sense to treat Germany as an autonomous entity, as 
if it still were that “subject” of national History that once presented itself alle-
gorically (M. Geyer). These are not oppositional histories of a traditional kind. 
Instead of suggesting another national story, they provide material for multiple 
stories and subordinate histories. They replace, in their interaction, the cohe-
rence and integralism of national History. In contrast to the traditional concern 
with “relativism” which worries about autonomous subjects and discrete ideol-
ogies floating indiscriminately through the past, the new challenge is to find 
ways of presenting and making sense of the interacting multiplicity of stories. 
                                                             
46  Henry A. Turner. Jr., German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler (New York, 1985). 
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For none of these subordinate histories is autonomous, a locale all for itself or a 
past in its own right. Instead of being left to their own devices, they are inte-
racting, contradictory, and contesting histories. As discrete historical subjects 
they form a far richer and grander universe than the one national History into 
which they were and are folded.49 
Studying alternative pasts shifts historiographic labors from establishing re-
ferentiality (between present text, sources, past reality) to intertextuality in the 
broadest sense. As it stands, affirmative and anti-stories are partly de-coupled 
but still relate to grand narratives. Histories of Austria or Histories of women 
have yet to become gender histories or histories of central Europe, which break 
the straight opposition of identity-alterity. We need a historiography that ex-
plores strategies or processes that link local sites of knowledge and experience 
and thereby interweave heterogeneity in full recognition of the powers of inte-
gration. Such histories are particularly apt to present not only the volatility of 
the German national past but also of its repeatedly changing place in (central) 
Europe. They are, moreover, capable of linking national histories to gendering 
processes and other forms of constituting alterity. Such efforts at refocusing the 
national story make it possible to wonder anew about the powers of nation-ness 
as a historical construct in its own right that managed to colonize, integrate, 
homogenize – so much so that “German,” “Czech,” or “Austrian” could be-
come field-defining designations. At stake is not one or the other aspect of an 
uncanny national character or national urges, but the emergence and submer-
gence of heterogeneity in a whole region. In any case, the sheer abandon of 
exploring the many “clouds” of the past, which characterized the eighties, is 
coming to an end. Will it be replaced by a univocal History which repeats the 
nineteenth century and its historians as melodrama or a set of regional histories 
that engage multiple pasts in a heterogeneous present? 
A deconstruction of metanarratives is difficult to conceive without a consid-
eration of the ways in which historians approach past events. This encompasses 
reflections on both the presentation of events or experiences in the past and 
their representation by historians in the present. Strategies which question this 
nexus are commonly referred to as the “linguistic turn.”50 The basic issues of 
                                                             
49  With a strong psychohistorical bias, Fred Weinstein, History and Theory after the Fall: An 
Essay on Interpretation (Chicago and London, 1990), is one of the first to discuss the prob-
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the re/presentation of the past have long been central to defining the place of 
history in the organization of knowledge and, more pragmatically, in determin-
ing what historians actually do. As a result there is a tremendous store of argu-
ments which is now being mobilized against real and alleged detractors who 
doubt the scholarly quality of history as a discipline. Such facile repetitions of 
past arguments create a rather false impression of the actual problems. In spite 
of an impressive number of defenses of referentiality and narrativity in the 
present, referentiality has become a matter of bewilderment and narrativity a 
source of puzzlement. Was not the cream of German historians utterly helpless, 
when facing an avalanche of emotional responses to a lowly TV soap opera on 
the Holocaust which moved people more than any historical monograph had 
done?51 This instant dramatized what all academics know: narrativity matters. 
The meaning of referentiality is also familiar. The abundance of sources dating 
back to the Third Reich and the utter scarcity of information on central turning 
points of the Third Reich has led more than one historian to take the Hitler 
diaries seriously.52 By the same token, oral historians have to untangle strands 
of equally valid “realities” in the consciousness of interviewees in order to 
uncover popular consciousness in the Third Reich which, in any event, was 
mediated by a whole battery of image machines.53 The “linguistic turn” is any-
thing but esoteric. It shapes the daily practice of every historian. 
The linguistic turn reflects the unmaking of old ground rules that linked a 
homogeneous past reality and its univocal articulation to a present narrative in 
an unequivocal and realist fashion. This predicament is commonly referred to 
as a “crisis of signification.”54 Such losses of referentiality are frightening and 
                                                                                                                                
lyse,” Diskurstheorie und Literaturwissenschaft, ed. Jürgen Fohrmann and Harro Müller 
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51  Peter Märthesheimer and Ivo Frenzel, eds., Im Kreuzfeuer, der Fernsehfilm “Holocaust”: 
Eine Nation ist betroffen (Frankfurt, 1979) Yizhak Ahren et al., Das Lehrstück “Holo-
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52  Richard Hugo, The Hitler Diaries (New York, 1983). 
53  See Anton Kaes, From Hitler to Heimat: The Return of History as Film (Cambridge, Mass., 
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make understandable the urge to hold on to and insist on realism in history 
which conflates text and reality. This common reaction also explains the nature 
of German historiography a little better. German History has not only given 
little credit to the country’s proverbial poets and thinkers, but it has also been 
stunningly negligent in considering “texts” and their meaning as historical 
artifacts. Yet we are told, second- and third-hand, that German thought ever 
since the eighteenth century was deeply concerned, even obsessed with prob-
lems of signification. German historiography, in other words, has desisted from 
reflecting on its own and its subjects’ condition which had experienced, time 
and again, the collapse of language in the face of “reality.”55 The origin of 
German history and its continuous fascination with linguistic realism appear, in 
this light, as efforts to neutralize an unmasterable and unspeakable present – 
the rapid succession of political ruptures in which one regime of signification 
followed the other. The present situation only reminds us of this condition. 
After having barely mastered a language for the past that seemed to encompass 
it all, even seasoned historians are slipping into mythical oratory in order to 
find words for the current reality. To say that they “make” reality in finding 
words for an uninterrupted past, would only reveal the secret of the profes-
sion.56 
The presentations of T. Childers, P. Jelavich, and R. Koshar indicate possi-
ble departures which are also returns to a forgotten German past. Their sugges-
tions for linguistically aware histories point to several directions. Pragmatical-
ly, the linguistic turn involves hunting down and exploring traces of the past 
which have not fit the canon of archival scholarship. Certain kinds of histories, 
like gender history, are only made possible as a result of non-canonical source 
work. Methodologically, the linguistic turn undoes the conflation of signifier 
(trace, text, artifact, image, commodity) and signified (“reality”). It questions 
referentiality in order to recover the discrete powers of signification as socially 
and historically constituted. With proper reflection on the problematic nature of 
referentiality and contextuality, highlighted by deconstruction,57 the linguistic 
turn leads to an exploration of the historicity of signification. The difficulties of 
this move and its prerequisite, a very careful deconstruction of meanings that 
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often will be the main and only purpose of studies, are readily evident from the 
everyday experience of a source-oriented historian. Texts do not necessarily 
mean what they are saying. Whole archives contain “non-records” or silences 
due to the nature of the collection.58 This has traditionally been a methodologi-
cal problem. But it has become a thematic focus of major importance – not the 
least in the face of a fragmented past with its many regimes of signification.59 A 
linguistically aware history explores how individuals and groups come to con-
strue meaning, why they make a certain sense of reality rather than another, 
and into what kinds of archives or collections their traces are gathered. 
Greater linguistic sensitivity may also help us in overcoming a basic im-
passe in the narration of the German story characterized by the insistence on 
either a (neo-)authentic or a (neo-)derivative reality. Despite old controversies 
on this matter, the power of creating, imposing, and resisting meaning has been 
oddly beyond the grasp of German historians, including Begriffsgeschichte, in 
their struggles over truer truths and more real realities.60 The result is a skewed 
history that reduces and tames the past to a single system of reference (Sinn). 
Histories of Germany without historians as watchdogs over realism in represen-
tation will be very different histories, indeed. Scholars following Jelavich, 
Childers, and Koshar will discover a Germany in which performances of identi-
ty ruled supreme, wars over imaginarles divided the people, while obscenely 
political and fanatical dreams could move people to crimes which spoken and 
written language kept them from recognizing. It is also a history in which dis-
                                                             
58  Particularly contemporary historians would do well to reconsider the issue of archives and 
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a useful introduction see Mark Poster, The Mode of Information: Poststructuralism and So-
cial Context (Chicago and London, 1990). 
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und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 71 (1984): 303-41, Reinhart Koselleck, “Begriffsgeschichte und 
Sozialgeschichte,” Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte: Aspekte und Probleme (Cologne, 
1972), 116-31, and Reinhart Koselleck, ed., Historische Semantik und Begriffsgeschichte 
(Stuttgart, 1978). 
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cipline is enacted in operatic flurries and in which obedience is elaborately 
choreographed, as students of Wagner or of the military will know. It is not 
least a history in which historians establish an unequivocal and timeless “reali-
ty” of the past in huge archives of knowledge which get lost time and again in 
the ruptures of yet another present. Taking words, texts, archives seriously and 
exploring/deconstructing their references and their elisions – these and similar 
interventions ascertain not just the linkages between knowledge and power but 
also identify institutions (like history, museums, preservation) and strategies 
(like realism) that maintained them – and those who break or broke them.61 
Such approaches reveal the ways and means of constructing “reality” as a po-
werful contested force in its own right. 
A third related change involves the evolution of social history into a more 
broadly based history of culture and/or experience. This reorientation of an 
initially behaviorist subdiscipline derives from a growing recognition of the 
numbing power of blanket references to society as causal category and from the 
poverty of social reductionism. Following the lead of some older mavericks 
like E. P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm, social historians have begun to em-
phasize the consciousness of social groups as non-derivative factor.62 At the 
same time intellectual historians have increasingly begun to overcome the high/ 
low culture divide to engage in a more broadly conceived analysis of popular 
culture.63 Even some hard-core quantitative historians have not just moved to 
more sophisticated techniques, but to new levels of documentation and argu-
mentation.64 Overall, the growing concern with a thick description of everyday 
life has led to a shift from sociology to anthropology as the more appropriate 
referential discipline65 – and from explanation to interpretation as the main 
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methodological strategy. It has also prompted an appropriation of anthropolo-
gy’s thematic focus on symbolic forms, rituals, and, if more hesitantly, perfor-
mances.66 
This recasting of social history has raised a host of methodological problems 
like the appropriate level of documentation, issues of representativeness, the 
reliability of oral records, and so on. But this expansive history is breaking 
apart the idealist/materialist mold of transatlantic history. The new culturalism 
is, no doubt, the most quickly expanding approach to the German past. This 
trend has also become something of a scourge in that it pops up everywhere 
and achieves nothing at all beyond changing labels. In lieu of old reductionist 
formulas we find new clichés that replace class with ritual, interest with sym-
bolic forms, and social formation with representation. Thinking representation 
has so quickly turned into one or the other kind of study of phenomena, images, 
or symbols as discrete artifacts/fetishes/commodities that neither the act of 
“presentation” nor the iterative and mimetic process of the “re-”presentation 
are further considered. 
Postmodern histories of culture, understood more properly and more res-
ponsibly, radically question the “object” nature of the historians’ past. This 
challenge has taken different forms. Coming from a series of microhistorical 
inquiries, cultural historians have dissolved the difference between subjective 
consciousness and objective existence in that they make experience into the 
central problematic of historical study.67 The resulting multiplication of inner 
and outer worlds – of witches and millers as much as of subalterns and free-
corps soldiers – has cracked the hard surface of materialist and idealist objecti-
fications of social groups and resulted in a dazzling array of worlds and coun-
terworlds that is not unlike the magic realism of some contemporary historical 
novels. Developing from a critique of totalist concepts (“society”) cultural 
histories have also begun to challenge the notion of an objective, transpersonal 
                                                                                                                                
Bernard S. Cohen, An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays (New Dehli, 
1987). A less glamorous aspect of every-day history is the revival of Landesgeschichte as 
Regionalgeschichte. See Gert Zang, Die unaufhaltsame Annäherung an das Einzelne: Re-
flexionen über den theoretischen und praktischen Nutzen der Regional- und Alltagsge-
schichte (Konstanz, 1985). 
66  The tantalizing remarks by Frank Trommler, “Über die Lesbarkeit der deutschen Kultur,” 
Germanistik in den USA: Neue Entwicklungen und Methoden (Opladen, 1989), 222-59. Re-
thinking Walter Benjamin and writing on historical performance is Michael Taussig, Sha-
manism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing (Chicago and 
London, 1987). A different, practical aspect of performative history is discussed in Alfred 
Frei and Ernst Baier, Geschichte spielen: Ein Handbuch für historische Stadtspiele (Pfaf-
fenweiler, 1990). 
67  Dominick LaCapra, History and Criticism (Ithaca and London, 1985); Carlo Ginzburg, 
Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method, trans. J. and A. Tedeschi (Baltimore, 1989). But 
see also the unbound subjectivism of Hans Peter Duerr, ed., Der Wissenschaftler und das 
Irrationale, 2 vols. (Frankfurt, 1981) and his Dreamtime: Concerning the Boundary be-
tween Wilderness and Civilization, trans. F. Goodman (Oxford and New York, 1985). 
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boundedness of society or social groups.68 Rather than working with collective 
subjects as explanans, they study the formation of collectivities as explanan-
dum. The old question of “societalization” (Vergesellschaftung), recovered as a 
problem of agency and of the “politics” of constituting “popular cultures” 
(Gramsci), is at the heart of this enterprise. 
The German scene of cultural history is, perhaps, most closely associated 
with another development, which is summarized under the label of Alltagsge-
schichte. As outlined by D. Crew, this every-day history has thoroughly col-
lapsed the distance between the past and present in its recovery of memory 
which makes the past an active force in the present. Mobilizing memory as a 
public act of self- or group-assertion and popularizing control over knowledge 
that has become professionalized and specialized have become responses to the 
recognition that the past, though alien, has a presence as memory.69 It is less 
well understood as a struggle over the privatization of the past in which the 
History Workshop movement runs up against efforts of commercializing (and 
servicing) memory. This only points to the fact that every-day historians could 
also profit from a more careful assessment of the present beyond historicist 
debates.70 
Three clusters of exploration have emerged from the intellectual ferment of 
the last two decades: making the objects of history into subjects of their past in 
the dissolution of grand theory in favor of dis/empowering stories and their 
potential grounds; understanding heterogeneous, subjective worlds, set free 
through deconstruction, as agents in the constitution of the “social”; and eluci-
dating the uncanny reality of the past in the present in the return to histories of 
consciousness and memory with the help of a reconsideration of the valence of 
words and the powers of media for past and contemporary perception. These 
departures date the peculiar knowledge that has shaped the historians’ enter-
prise and make it part of a vanishing past. In particular, they have challenged a 
postwar transatlantic imaginary that appeared to be eroding long before the 
                                                             
68  Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical 
Democratic Politics, trans. W. Moore and P. Cammad (London, 1985).  
69  For responses see Alfred Frei, “Erinnern – Bedenken – Lernen: Über den Versuch das 
Unbeschreibliche zu beschreiben,” Erinnern, Bedenken, Lernen, ed. A. Frei and J. Runge 
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neglect TV. However, more history “happens” on TV than anywhere else, notwithstanding 
the pretensions of the American Historical Review! See Helmut Dotterweich, “Fernsehen 
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kann Historie vermitteln,” Die Zeit (11 January 1985), 14. On film see Rolf Aurich. “Film 
in der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft,” Geschichtswerkstatt 17 (1989): 54-66.  
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events of 1989. More radical approaches have tried to go beyond History as 
“modern” discipline and have begun to explore the grounds on which historical 
consciousness arose in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.71 Both 
interventions insist that this is not willful, but a response to radically changing 
conditions in the present. All this hung in a balance throughout the eighties. 
Historians have had particular difficulty in joining the arguments which linked 
the critique of modern(ist) modes of knowledge to an emergent new (informa-
tion/postindustrial) society. They have resisted translating them into their own 
terrain, even after an emergent memory industry (TV, film) has begun to take 
over much of the historians’ domain. Many scholars have been reluctant to 
confront this wholesale reorganization of cultural capital. Odd as it may be for 
academics, the current recasting of Europe apparently leads them more easily 
to reconsider their assumptions and approaches. The political rupture realigns, 
as so often before, the social order in central Europe and reorganizes the trans-
atlantic economy of signs (and undoubtedly will create a new cast of realist 
historians). This political break-up of a transatlantic imaginary continues what 
postmodern thought has started some time ago, although not necessarily with 
the intended result. 
IV 
As after every major upheaval of the twentieth century, the process of rethink-
ing German history is beginning once again. The current reconsideration is 
shaped by the dual challenge and potential clash of an intellectual reorientation, 
prompted by postmodernism, and a political reformulation, inspired by German 
unification. The former impulse suggests a more reflective and a multiple ap-
proach to the German past. As indicated above, the end of grand theory, the 
linguistic turn, and the revival of interests in culture have just begun to open up 
German historiography to a variety of distinctive, yet interwoven narrations of 
the central European past. Together, they suggest a self-conscious multicultu-
ralism and a de-hegemonialization of perspective. The redemptive quality of 
these histories lies in the insistence on the multiplicity of worlds and the 
strength of self-will (Eigensinn) which has resisted anew the effort to homo-
genize people into a society with a univocal and unilinear past. The latter 
process might imply a restoration of a national masternarrative. A simplistic 
reading of the current political changes creates the danger that this door will be 
slammed by a precipitous return to a national masterplot, somewhat reduced in 
size and chastened in spirit, but still recognizably related to the familiar klein-
deutsch story. Instead of ending in the defeat and partition of 1945, the drama 
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has just received a fresh and perhaps happier ending, a new terminus ad quem, 
which might suggest interpreting the prior disasters as purgatories on the road 
to a model Germany – a redemption of the Germans by themselves as a prere-
quisite for healing the division of Europe. Both visions leave behind the post-
war imaginary. But they raise the question more pressingly how intellectual 
and political trajectories of reconstituting the past relate to one another. 
Since external unification has barely been completed, while internal unity 
will take years to come, its full impact upon the writing of history remains 
indistinct. First indications are that, in West Germany, the traditionalists appear 
overjoyed that their preservation and elaboration of a nineteenth-century Prus-
sian-German narrative has apparently been validated along with their anti-
Communist politics. Their critics of the Bielefeld school seem intent on safe-
guarding a “modernist” Weberian understanding of the past as a guarantee for a 
post-nationalist, European constitutionalism. For the radical every-day histo-
rians, encouraged by the initial basis democracy but doubtful about the goal 
and speed of unification, this fall-back into national rhetoric appears dispiriting, 
since it might forbode a new disciplining of dissent.72 At the same time, some 
older GDR scholars seem defensive about their Marxist achievements and 
others scramble unseemly to adopt Western rhetoric. Some younger historians, 
inspired by the civic movement, are ready, on the other hand, to throw off the 
Communist shackles and to explore new approaches. One can only hope that, 
together with their alternative colleagues in the West, they will eventually 
engage in a historical reflection and a critical preservation of what have be-
come the newest archives and the ruins of an already forgotten and repressed 
past. In many ways, the Stalinist GDR appears already more remote than  
Bismarck’s Germany.73 
In the United States, the “Eastern European” upheaval is likely to resuscitate 
politically oriented studies, which have been in decline for several decades. 
Such efforts are motivated by expectations for a return to a nineteenth-century 
multipolarity of powers in Europe and a new triumph of German Machtpoli-
tik,74 This also appears to be a strong sense in France and Great Britain. Simul-
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taneously and often indiscriminately, there has been much thoughtless gloating 
over the victory of capitalism (if that is what it was), coupled with a somewhat 
saner appreciation of the victory of parliamentary democracy. As much as 
“parliamentarism” in central and eastern Europe is celebrated, the darker sides 
of popular sovereignty are also evoked, giving way to a very old distrust of 
these European “natives.” Old fears of east European nationalism and of Ger-
man aspirations have resurfaced, recalling the world wars, interwar “ethnic 
conflicts,” and the Holocaust. The first response to the present rupture then 
seems to have been a hardening of ideological and historiographical fronts, 
with socialism seemingly in full retreat. But as at every such juncture the ree-
valuation of the German and central European past is bound to continue for a 
long time.75 
A more careful look at the peaceful revolution in the GDR and the unifica-
tion with the FRG suggests that the German problem needs to be mapped out 
anew. As part of a broader central and eastern European transformation, recent 
events do not really fit the pattern that the transatlantic imaginary had led histo-
rians to expect. In spite of all sorts of rash commentary, neither Huns or Junk-
ers nor their evil stand-ins populate Germany, and even the skinheads, racist 
and chauvinist brutes that they are, have to be made into Nazis by analogy. The 
old German problem has been successfully exorcized and, with it, the high 
drama of the West which is so hard to let go for veteran commentators. But 
there is a German problem, although it appears in a new light. Elements of a 
reconsideration are readily evident. The peaceful revolution in East Germany, 
based on non-violent civic movements against the SED dictatorship and its 
oppressive symbol of the Wall, requires explanations not contained in the con-
ventional tale of blood and iron. Suddenly, 1871 appears in a very different 
light, even if unification evokes that analogy. If the Prussian coup appears more 
necessary than ever to German traditionalists, it does the opposite for German 
liberals – and it might remind American historians of the peculiar historicity 
that linked national sovereignty to Statebuilding; for the two are moving apart 
in the present conjuncture.76 The simultaneous turn away from a socialist re-
newal within the GDR to unification (die Wende in der Wende), largely promp-
ted by popular desires, combined democratic and national aspirations in an 
unprecedented development. True enough, there are nineteenth-century analo-
gies or twentieth-century parallels, but the notable absence of violence and 
chauvinist hysteria require fresh answers. It appears that unity and liberty can 
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be reconciled after all, but it may just as well be the case that the social signifi-
cation of “unity” and “liberty” have radically changed over time. If both were 
once linked to notions of property, they now appear to be linked to notions of, 
even entitlements to, consumption. Last but not least, the “American” way of 
life undoubtedly exerted some media pull on GDR citizens, but United States 
policies have remained in the background compared to the impact of Soviet 
perestroika, eroding the assumption of a German redemption in a revivified 
Atlanticism. What kind of redemptive stories lie beyond national or transatlan-
tic History? Have there been other stories that historians never quite took into 
consideration? Though with sufficient effort almost anything can be made to 
fit, recent central European upheavals have broken the transatlantic frame, with 
all the set-piece answers and comforting familiarities. Long settled questions 
about “revolution” or “nation” have suddenly been posed anew, requiring not 
just some slight retouching, but a more fundamental rethinking of the German 
past.77 
In this situation, postmodern thought can make the difference. The ceaseless 
contests over identity and hegemony in that pivotal region, a seam of European 
affairs that always ruptured during a general reorganization of the continent, 
can only be grasped if they are approached not in preconceived national terms 
but in a more open-ended fashion as the iterative constitution of nation-ness. 
The debunking of grand theories and masternarratives offers the intellectual 
space which is necessary to treat nationality as a construct with changing fron-
tiers, governmental systems, ideological allegiances, and social fabrics. The 
interweaving of heterogeneous worlds allows historians to counteract the sub-
ordination of difference through the affirmative realism of past historiography. 
The linguistic turn is more essential than ever in decoding the construction of 
meaning and counter-meanings, of official fabrication of information and its 
potential subversive effects. Indeed, central and eastern Europe have been 
every-day laboratories for deconstruction, as the old Stalinist truths crumble 
with even older (socialist, Catholic, nationalist, but also liberal) ones that were 
the spiritual source for resistance in the first place. During the heady autumn of 
1989, the very language of repression crumbled when the Honecker-Krenz 
slogans lost credibility and a new civic vocabulary of resistance and participa-
tion sprang upon the scene only to be abandoned in the onslaught of Western 
image machines. Finally, cultural analysis is essential in uncovering the inter-
nal erosion of party confidence, the growth of an oppositional subculture, as 
well as the surprising eruption of a previously latent anti-Communism of a 
silent majority. Not just prompted by economic difficulties, this triple revolu-
tion of consciousness preceded the breathtaking change of regimes. It was 
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fuelled by the search for societal bonds, not mediated by the state, and for a 
language of collectivity, not based on multiple layers of fabrications that have, 
simultaneously, exposed the very need for and the very frailty of social rela-
tions. In making sense and giving historical depth to political expressions of the 
German situation, the seemingly contradictory political and intellectual im-
pulses of postmodern thought and political transformation go hand in hand.78 
The search for new explanations and interpretations will pull German and 
American scholars apart inadvertently. German historians of Germany are 
remaking their past through creating a fresh present, be it national or European. 
They are in the midst of an exhilarating and occasionally frightening process 
which American scholars, contrary to the postwar years, can only observe, but 
neither direct nor duplicate. Even if the current efforts at unity, democracy, and 
peace are a greater success than earlier German attempts, as is to be hoped, 
they are going to be German and not American triumphs like those after World 
War II. Though some U.S. commentators are beginning to claim part of the 
credit, transatlantic influences have played at best an indirect, facilitating role. 
To be forthright: as much as there is no German Havel, the latter is no Jefferson 
but a Czechoslovak patriot. Even hesitant American scholars will recognize in 
the face of the European reorganization of Europe that Foucault had a point to 
make when he linked knowledge to power rather than truth; for power rests in 
Germany and that will continue to be the German problem. It is to be seen what 
new truth will come with it. 
At the same time, the United States is also remade, and not just in the reor-
ganization of the Atlantic world and the America-centered postwar imaginary. 
Within academe, North American scholars, working in polyhistory depart-
ments, will gravitate increasingly to multiple narratives, comparative or other-
wise, and will prove more sensitive to issues of subordination and alterity, if 
only to teach an extremely diverse student body. They are also much more 
affected by the collapse of high cultural pretensions and canonic certainties, 
exemplified in the advance of visual forms of representation and the privatiza-
tion of the past, which will lead them, willy-nilly, to experiment with postmo-
dern forms of presentation. Cultural capital, being heavily guarded by the state 
in Germany, is much more open to radical reorganization in the United States. 
As a result, history as a discipline and German histories in particular face a 
realignment – if they do not want to become “ethnic” histories which are pro-
tected by German Kulturpolitik. Last but not least, the multiethnic context of 
the United States may lead to a fuller appreciation of the multiculturalism in 
the European past and present. The latter still sounds somewhat strange to 
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central European ears, even if the influx of guestworkers, asylum seekers, and 
ethnic remigrants to Germany makes it increasingly appropriate there as well 
and even if the realities of an integrated, yet diverse Europe require more than 
the contrived acknowledgement of “otherness.”79 
The dual political and intellectual transformation of Europe and the United 
States will reshape the understanding of the German and European past in the 
next decade on both sides of the Atlantic. If American historians of central 
Europe draw upon their cross-national perspective, explore the possibilities of 
multiculturalism, and engage in a careful examination of the constitution of 
cultures, they will be able to make sense of the longstanding contestations over 
transnational power-configurations, national sovereignty, and social hegemony 
which have shaped Europe in the modern period. In keeping alive the memory 
of the disasters which central European ruptures engendered, they may not just 
help to prevent a narrow renationalization of the German past, but also warn 
against the dangers of political paranoia in the face of the present conditions in 
the United States and Europe. In this capacity, they will continue to have a 
distinct and distinguished voice. 
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